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2, 2015.1. INTRODUCTION
The provision of public goods, a key component of govern-
ment performance, varies substantially across communities. It
varies in terms of which goods and services are provided, how
they are provided, how well, and in what amounts. This in
turn can have broad implications, directly and indirectly, for
economic development. A variety of structural, institutional,
and cultural factors, as well as individual agency, may con-
tribute to this variation (see, e.g., Gormley, 2007; Lijphart,
2012; Putnam, 1993). This paper focuses on one key factor
emphasized in the literature on developing countries: social
divisions, in particular those expressed in ethnic terms. As
Banerjee, Iyer, and Somanathan (2005, p. 639) note, ‘‘the
notion that social divisions undermine economic progress,
not just in extremis, as in the case of a civil war, but also in
more normal times” is ‘‘one of the most powerful hypotheses
in political economy.” High ethnic diversity as a factor that
impedes economic development has received particular
attention in work on sub-Saharan Africa, not only the most
ethnically diverse world region but also the least developed
(Ashraf & Galor, 2013a, 2013b; Easterly & Levine, 1997;
Go¨ren, 2014; Posner, 2004). 1
The ‘‘diversity debit” hypothesis – that ethnic diversity has a
negative impact on social, economic, and political outcomes –
is widely accepted (Gerring, Thacker, Lu, & Huang, 2015).
Indeed, with respect to public goods provision – our focus in
this article – the conventional wisdom holds that a negative
relationship between ethnic divisions and public goods
provision is so well-established empirically that future research308should abandon examination of whether such a relationship
exists and focus instead on why it exists, that is, on testing
hypotheses about the mechanisms underlying this negative
relationship (Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner, & Weinstein,
2007; Lieberman & McClendon, 2013).
This article makes two key contributions to the literature:
First, it challenges the conventional wisdom on empirical
grounds. It shows at the sub-national level strong evidence
for a positive relationship between ethnic diversity and some
measures of public goods provision, in particular welfare
outcomes related to goods and services publicly provided.
We spotlight here ﬁndings from a handful of recent studies
(Gerring et al., 2015; Gibson & Hoﬀman, 2013; Gisselquist,
2014; Singh, 2010) and draw particularly on new analysis at
district level for Zambia in which we consider both govern-
ment spending and a range of welfare indicators. Given that
the diversity debit hypothesis is so often applied to Africa,
empirical analysis on the region is highly relevant to its testing
yet it has been impeded by the relatively weak data available
for the region. We employ a new dataset compiled by one of
the authors from administrative, budget, and survey data,
which cover a broader range of public goods outcomes than
previous work (see Leiderer, 2014). As a relatively stable
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been salient in routine forms of politics, Zambia thus provides
a valuable test case (Lindemann, 2011a, 2011b; Posner, 2005).
Second, this study contributes to theory building: Given the
much more nuanced relationship between ethnic diversity and
public goods provision documented in our analysis, the key
task we identify for future work is not to address why the rela-
tionship is negative, but under what conditions such direction
holds true. As existing theory relates principally to the diver-
sity debit hypothesis, there is considerable scope for theory
building with reference to the mechanisms underlying diversity
dividends. In this study we explore several working hypotheses
drawn from the literature against the Zambian data.
The next section of this article reviews the conventional wis-
dom and empirical evidence with regard to the diversity debit
hypothesis, and situates our analysis within a set of emerging
critiques. In terms of the empirical evidence, we highlight the
importance of distinguishing at a minimum between national
and sub-national analysis and show that when such a distinc-
tion is made, it becomes clear that evidence at the sub-national
level does not give support for a diversity debit hypothesis.
Building on this discussion, we spell out what we would expect
to ﬁnd in the Zambian data if the diversity debit hypothesis
were correct, parsing diﬀerent expectations for sub-national
budgetary outcomes and sub-national welfare outcomes
within a ﬁscally centralized country like Zambia. In this con-
text, we present evidence and possible theoretical bases for a
‘‘diversity divided.” The article then turns to the Zambian
case. Section 3 discusses the data, and the measures of ethnic
diversity and public goods provision whereas Sections 4 and 5
present the empirical model used in our analysis, and key
results, respectively. We return to the question of explanation
and theory building in Section 6. A ﬁnal section concludes.2. THE DIVERSITY DEBIT HYPOTHESIS: MECHA-
NISMS, EVIDENCE, AND CRITIQUE
Literature in the diversity debit tradition points to multiple
ways in which diverse communities may have negative implica-
tions for public goods provision when compared to more
homogenous communities. 2 Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly
(1999), perhaps the article most well-cited as evidence of a neg-
ative relationship, builds its underlying model on two key
assumptions about ethnic groups. First, ethnic groups may
have diﬀerent preferences over what is provided, where, and
how (Chandra, 2001). Because of such preferences, community
members in heterogeneous areas – when compared to those in
homogeneous areas – may obtain lower utility from shared
public services and thus support lower contributions to their
provision. Second, members of ethnic groups may have similar
preferences but be prejudiced against other groups, for instance
valuing public goods less because they prefer not to mix with
other groups. In the Alesina et al. (1999) model, the average
individual’s utility is ui ¼ gað1 liÞ þ c; where g is the public
good, li is the distance between individual i’s preferred type
of public good and the public good provided, and c is private
consumption (see also Kimenyi, 2006). 3 The model predicts
that in a majoritarian electoral system, the median distance
from the median voter’s ideal type (lmi ), an indicator of the
polarization of preferences, will determine the size of the public
good, which will decrease as polarization increases.
A second broad argument highlighted in the literature
focuses on public goods provision as a collective action
problem, resolved best in situations where social capital is
strong, trust levels are high, and shirkers can be punished(Olson, 1965). Because social capital, trust, and social sanc-
tions may be weaker in ethnically diverse communities than
in homogeneous ones, diverse communities are expected to
be less able to resolve the collective action problems needed
to provide public goods at socially optimal levels (Bahry,
Kosolapov, Kozyreva, & Wilson, 2005; Khwaja, 2009;
Mavridis, 2015; Miguel & Gugerty, 2005; Putnam, 2007).
Relatedly, cooperation and collective action in homogeneous
communities as compared to heterogeneous ones may be facil-
itated at a practical level by shared language and cultural
norms, geographic proximity, and within-group personal
connections (Deutsch, 1966; Habyarimana et al., 2007).
A third line of argument highlights the role of elites, under-
scoring that ethnic diversity – in addition to inﬂuencing public
goods provision through the preferences and actions of
individual voters and community members – may also have
impact through leaders and governing bodies. For instance,
just as ethnic diversity may impact collective action at the level
of the individual community member, it may also do so within
the bodies that govern communities as members may be less
able to collaborate to pass diﬃcult legislation or more likely
to deadlock in decisions over conﬂicting agendas. Members
of government in ethnically divided polities further may owe
their power to narrow ethnic constituencies rather than more
broadly-based ones, which may in turn inﬂuence them to favor
policies that support their own ethnic bases over others and to
divert resources in economically ineﬃcient ways (Easterly &
Levine, 1997; Franck & Rainer, 2012).
Each of these arguments is consistent with a negative rela-
tionship between ethnic diversity and measures of public
goods provision. The conventional wisdom holds that this
negative relationship is empirically well-established, citing a
number of studies (e.g., Alesina et al., 1999, Alesina & La
Ferrara, 2000; Easterly & Levine, 1997; Miguel & Gugerty,
2005). The priority then for future research is considered to
be the mechanisms underlying this negative relationship – that
is, their further elaboration and testing (Habyarimana et al.,
2007; Lieberman & McClendon, 2013).
(a) Reassessing the empirical evidence
In reviewing the empirical evidence for the diversity debit
hypothesis, one of the ﬁrst points to note is that little distinc-
tion has been made in the literature between empirical analyses
at the national versus sub-national levels. In other words, the
hypothesis is routinely applied in the same way to explain vari-
ation in public goods provision both across and within coun-
tries (villages, municipalities, cities), and empirical analyses at
the national level are routinely cited as evidence that the
hypothesis should apply at sub-national levels and vice versa.
The fact that levels of government ﬁgure little in this discus-
sion is worthy of further consideration because there are mul-
tiple reasons that we normally expect public goods provision
at national and sub-national levels of government to diﬀer.
For one, diﬀerent levels of government have diﬀerent roles
and responsibilities, suggesting that we normally look ﬁrst to
the level of government with most discretion over a particular
good for explanations about its provision. For instance, study
of variation in the provision of education and health services
at the municipal level – as a function of municipal-level factors
alone – would be potentially misleading in a country where
education and health policies were highly centralized at
the national level, or where decisions about education were
made primarily at the local level and those about health policy
at the state level. In addition, in terms of budgetary outcomes,
intergovernmental transfers add a level of complexity to
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vices may come both from national and sub-national levels,
with the relative contribution of each varying not only across
countries but within them as well. In the United States, for
instance, federal, state, and local governments all contribute
to education and the relative contribution of the federal level
varies across states.
This suggests that in evaluating the empirical bases upon
which the conventional wisdom rests, it is worth at a minimum
separating consideration of empirical studies at national versus
sub-national levels. Broadly speaking, empirical support for a
negative relationship appears relatively robust across major
studies of national-level variation, considering a range of pub-
lic goods measures and speciﬁcations. 4 Easterly and Levine
(1997)’s seminal analysis showed ethnic heterogeneity to be a
signiﬁcant factor in explaining Africa’s slow growth relative
to East Asia through its eﬀect on low schooling, insuﬃcient
infrastructure, political instability, underdeveloped ﬁnancial
systems, distorted foreign exchange markets, and high govern-
ment deﬁcits. Posner (2004) extended this analysis, showing
fractionalization among ‘‘politically relevant” ethnic groups
to be associated also with internal variation in growth across
African countries. Baldwin and Huber (2010) ﬁnd support
for a negative relationship in the analysis of 46 countries using
an aggregate measure based on ten variables related to educa-
tion, health, sanitation, infrastructure, and the regulatory
framework for private sector activity; Jackson (2013) in anal-
ysis of education, drinking water, and electricity across 18
African countries; and Gerring et al. (2015) for human
development outcomes, including child mortality, fertility,
education, and wealth, across 36 developing countries.
At the sub-national level, on the other hand, the literature
shows empirical support for the diversity debit hypothesis to
be less clear. Gerring et al. (2015) in particular ﬁnd support
at the national level, but the opposite – a positive relationship
between ethnic diversity and human development outcomes –
at the sub-national level. Similarly, and particularly relevant
for our analysis is the study of local district councils in Zambia
by Gibson and Hoﬀman (2013) which shows ethnic fractional-
ization to be positively correlated with local government
expenditures.
Sub-national analyses have also demonstrated an important
distinction between divisions and diversity, providing evidence
that it is ethnic division, not diversity per se, that is associated
with a negative relationship. Miguel (2004), in particular,
shows in a comparative analysis of communities in Tanzania
to those in Kenya – where national identity versus ethnic iden-
tity is comparatively strong and vice versa – that the negative
relationship holds only in the latter context, while Singh (2010)
ﬁnds based on longitudinal analysis of social development in
Kerala that it is the absence of a subjective sense of
‘‘we-ness,” that drives negative outcomes (see also Kanbur,
Rajaram, & Varshney, 2011). This is an important caveat to
the diversity debit hypothesis, suggesting that a ‘‘division
debit” hypothesis might be a better term. 5
Arguably the strongest evidence for a negative relationship
between ethnic diversity/divisions and public goods provision
is Alesina et al. (1999), which draws on U.S. census data and
budget information from all cities, metropolitan areas, and
urban counties with at least 25,000 people to consider a range
of dependent variables on spending. Consistent with the diver-
sity debit hypothesis, the article shows that ethnic fractional-
ization (measured in racial terms) is negatively associated,
and statistically signiﬁcant, with the share of public spending
on roads, education, welfare, and sewage and trash pickup.
While this analysis is notable in the strength and detail of thebudgetary data employed, there are several problems with the
wide application of these ﬁndings. First, as the authors them-
selves take care to highlight, some of their results – including
those on spending on health – are not consistent with a negative
relationship. 6 Second, a subsequent examination of the same
data (Gisselquist, 2014) ﬁnds that results are weakened when
controls for state-level eﬀects are included. As ﬁscal responsi-
bilities and regulations diﬀer across states, as does ethnic
fractionalization, failing to control for state-level eﬀects has
arguably biased Alesina et al.’s results on fractionalization.
Gisselquist (2014) also argues for the relevance of examining
additional outcomes, showing in particular a positive relation-
ship between fractionalization and levels of educational expen-
diture per child, which is a better measure of public goods
provision than the share of total public spending on education.
Finally, to the best of our knowledge no similar ﬁndings have
been replicated outside the U.S., and particularly not in sub-
Saharan Africa where the hypothesis is so often applied. Even
if we accept that there is a generally negative relationship
between ethnic divisions and spending on public goods in the
U.S., it is plausible that the results of this study are not exter-
nally valid because ethnic relations and governance are com-
paratively unique in the U.S. 7 With respect to sub-Saharan
Africa in particular, perhaps the most obvious distinction con-
cerns the relevance of formal versus informal institutions in
governance and the ways in which governance functions diﬀer-
ently in relatively high rule of law settings, such as the U.S., as
compared to lower rule of law settings and neopatrimonial
regimes, as in much of Africa (Bratton & van de Walle,
1994). For Zambia in particular, von Soest (2007) ﬁnds that
informal, not formal institutions, are key to understanding
state resources and tax collection. In situations where informal
institutions are more important than formal institutions in
policy-making, predictions drawn from formal models of
voting (as in Alesina et al.) can be particularly problematic.
That said, a few notable studies conducted at the sub-
national level in Africa do provide evidence consistent with
diversity debit predictions; however, they have focused on
the relationship between ethnic divisions and a more limited
range of public goods outcomes than Alesina et al., including
education (funding, quality of facilities, and textbook owner-
ship) and the maintenance of water wells, in non-
representative population samples of Kenya and Tanzania
(Miguel, 2004; Miguel & Gugerty, 2005).
In short, and contrary to the conventional wisdom, the
extant literature shows that empirical evidence for the diver-
sity debit hypothesis is by no means conclusive at the sub-
national level, with some studies showing mixed or limited
support and others suggesting the opposite relationship. The
extant literature thus suggests the value of further empirical
work on whether such a relationship exists (1) at the sub-
national level, (2) in neopatrimonial African countries, and
(3) for a wider and more disaggregated range of public goods
outcomes. We turn to such analysis in the next section of this
article. While our focus is on empirical testing of whether
diversity debit predictions hold, we return at the end of this
article to possible explanations of the discordant empirical
ﬁndings thus established.
Before turning to the Zambian case, it is worth clarifying
what we would expect to ﬁnd if the diversity debit hypothesis
were correct. The basic prediction is that a negative relation-
ship should be displayed between diversity and various public
goods outcomes. In light of the discussion above regarding the
diﬀerent roles and responsibilities of national versus sub-
national governments, however, we focus in our analysis on
a simple reﬁnement of the basic prediction. For countries in
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highly centralized – as in much of sub-Saharan Africa, includ-
ing Zambia – we amend the basic prediction as follows: First,
we distinguish between budgetary outcomes and other mea-
sures of government performance, in particular related welfare
outcomes. The diversity debit theory predicts a negative rela-
tionship between ethnic diversity and expenditure on public
goods. In the ﬁscally centralized case, however, local govern-
ments and constituencies should have, by deﬁnition, little
direct, formal inﬂuence on budgets as budgetary allocations
and policies are decided at the center. 8 Thus, if the diversity
debit hypothesis operates through one or more of the direct local
channels outlined above, the characteristics of local communi-
ties should not directly inﬂuence total expenditure (including
central government transfers), but they should inﬂuence
implementation, how communities use and interact with gov-
ernment services, and related welfare outcomes. For instance,
diversity’s relation to preferences or social capital may inﬂu-
ence parents’ decisions to enroll their children in school, and
thus educational enrollment rates. Our revised prediction
therefore is: If the diversity debit hypothesis is correct, and if
it operates through one or more of the direct local channels
outlined above, we should ﬁnd a negative relationship between
diversity and welfare outcomes, but we would not expect to ﬁnd
a relationship between diversity and total budgetary outcomes.
This revised prediction implies that the relationship between
diversity and public goods at sub-national levels may diﬀer for
diﬀerent public goods outcomes and that whether there is a
relationship with some outcomes – namely, budgetary ones –
might depend on the degree of ﬁscal decentralization. It fur-
ther underscores that the standard arguments underlying the
diversity debit hypothesis as outlined above may fail to predict
outcomes at sub-national levels in particular because they do
not take into account the inﬂuence of interaction between
levels of government. In other words, they are ‘‘single-level”
theories focusing on the channels through which, for instance,
local-level characteristics directly impact decisions and actions
within local entities that inﬂuence outcomes measured at the
local level – when it is plausible that local-level characteristics
inﬂuence decisions and actions taken at the national-level,
which in turn inﬂuence outcomes measured at the local level.
This latter multi-level process would be consistent with the
literature on distributive politics exploring how politicians
target public expenditure to certain regions in order to support
either core or swing voters (see Cox & McCubbins, 1986; Dixit
& Londregan, 1996; Golden & Min, 2013; Kramon & Posner,
2013; Lindbeck & Weibull, 1987).
In contexts where political support and voting are
associated with ethnicity, furthermore, we might also ﬁnd a
relationship between sub-national ethnic characteristics – not
necessarily diversity – and sub-national public goods
provision, including budgetary outcomes. For instance, if
politicians provide more resources to swing constituencies
(over core constituencies), and political support bases are
ethnic, public spending may be higher in constituencies that
are either ethnically-mixed or consist mainly of members of
a ‘‘swing” ethnic group (Wantchekon, 2003). In a situation
where swing constituencies tend to be ethnically-mixed, a pos-
itive relationship between diversity and budgetary outcomes
would then be observed. On the other hand, if politicians
support core ethnic constituencies instead, the relationship
should be between ethnic strongholds and higher spending.
The literature on distributive politics thus suggests some
explanatory hypotheses to be developed in future work. We
consider several controls for political competition in ouranalysis in an exploratory way, and return to related hypothe-
ses in Section 6 at the end of this article.
Finally, Gibson and Hoﬀman (2013) provide a useful point
of departure for our analysis of Zambia as it speaks precisely
to the relationship between sub-national ethnic diversity and
government expenditure. Their ﬁnding of a positive relation-
ship between diversity and local spending clearly runs counter
to the basic diversity debit prediction. However, as they
exclude central government transfers, their analysis cannot
be explained by the basic distributive politics story outlined
above and focuses only on a negligible share of public spend-
ing. This underscores the importance of a deeper examination.
Despite continuing eﬀorts toward decentralization, govern-
ment expenditure in Zambia – as in most sub-Saharan African
countries – remains highly centralized. Most social sector
spending on health and education is channeled through the
central government via de-concentrated units at district level
(District Health Management Teams – DHMTs, and District
Education Boards – DEBs). In fact, total local council spend-
ing accounts for less than 5% of Zambian general government
expenditure (Republic of Zambia, 2008). Moreover, local
spending on service delivery is even smaller. In 2007, for
instance, local councils spent on average a mere 10% of their
expenditure on service delivery (Leiderer et al., 2012). Thus,
to understand how diversity relates more broadly to public
goods outcomes in Zambia, it is necessary to consider central
government transfers rather than local-level expenditure,
along with other measures of implementation and related
welfare outcomes. We present such an analysis in Section 4.
3. DATA
We use a new purpose-built disaggregated dataset for
Zambia covering the period 2004–09 at district level. 9 To
address biases that may be caused by the fact that cities tend
to be both more ethnically diverse and wealthier than rural
and peri-urban areas, we exclude the four cities in the country
from our analysis and limit our sample to 68 districts
(14 municipal and 54 rural).
Data are drawn from the following sources: the Census of
Population and Housing for 2000 and 2010 for information
on ethnicity and language use; the 2006 Living Conditions
Monitoring Survey (LCMS) for information on poverty levels
and other district characteristics; the annual Government
Financial Reports (GFR) for the years 2004–09 for informa-
tion on budget allocations from the central government to
districts; and administrative data provided by the Ministry
of Health and the Ministry of Education for health and educa-
tion outcomes. Most of these sources are generally not readily
available and were obtained mostly from government sources
by one of the authors during extensive ﬁeld work in Zambia
during 2009–11. While it is important to recognize the poten-
tial weaknesses and inaccuracies in such oﬃcial statistics and
ﬁnancial reports, which have been well-documented in the
African context (Anderson & Cheeseman, 2013; Jerven,
2013; Reinikka & Svensson, 2004; van de Walle, 2001), these
sources provide the best data on these topics currently
available for Zambia.
This new dataset oﬀers important beneﬁts over data used in
previous studies of ethnic diversity and public goods provi-
sion. First, it allows us to examine the relationship between
ethnic diversity and executed government expenditure to dis-
tricts and to control for central government expenditure in
analysis of other district-level governance outcomes. Second,
and unlike most previous studies which have been conducted
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longer term behaviors in a dynamic setting.
(a) Measuring diversity
In Zambia, both tribal and linguistic cleavages have been
salient in politics and governance (Lindemann, 2011a,
2011b; Posner, 2005). The 2000 Census includes information
on individuals’ self-reported ethnicity as well as on each
person’s predominant language of communication. Both vari-
ables are coded in the census according to the same 61 local
languages, grouped into seven main ethno-linguistic groups:
Bemba, Tonga, North-Western, Barotse, Nyanja, Mambwe,
and Tumbuka; plus an eighth group for ‘‘other”, which for
the predominant language-use variable includes English
(Republic of Zambia, 2000, p. 101). 10
For the purpose of this article, we capture ethnic diversity in
terms of the index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF)
at the district level using both ‘‘ethnic” and ‘‘language”
categories. While the literature oﬀers a number of alternative
measures, we use this measure because it is in the widest use
by far, including in the work cited above (McDoom &
Gisselquist, 2015). Fractionalization is calculated as:




where qgi is the population share of language or ethnic group
g = 1. . .n, in district i. The obtained ethnic (ELF-E) and lin-
guistic (ELF-L) fractionalization indices are highly but not
perfectly correlated, with a correlation coeﬃcient r = 0.85. 11
As a robustness check, we estimate the models presented in
Section 4 with both indices.
(b) Measuring public goods provision via government
expenditure
Zambia introduced government-wide activity-based budget-
ing in 2004 and government ﬁnancial reports (GFRs) follow a
mixed administrative and program classiﬁcation. This allowed
us to extract information on central government expenditure
on health and education in each district.
Education expenditure by district is recorded in the GFRs
under two diﬀerent budget lines, ‘‘Regional Headquarters”
and ‘‘Basic Schools.” Under the former, expenditures admin-
istered by each District Education Board (DEB) are recorded,
including grants for free basic education and infrastructure
development. Under the latter, two expenditure items are
reported over which the local DEBs formally have no inﬂu-
ence: salaries and other emoluments, and grants to basic
schools that are transferred from the Ministry of Education
to DEB oﬃces from where they are distributed among schools
according to an allocation formula based on school character-
istics such as enrollment ﬁgures, number of classes, and a
gender parity factor (IOB, 2008, p. 31; World Bank, 2008,
p. 76). 12 For health, all expenditure at district level is recorded
under the budget line of the respective District Health
Management Team (DHMT).
For the purpose of this study, we extracted a total of seven
expenditure categories at district level for the years 2004–09.
For education, these include total education expenditure,
DEB administered expenditure, basic schools allocations,
grants to basic schools, and teachers’ salaries. For health,
these are total health expenditure and expenditure on health
service delivery (which is available only for 2006–09 and
includes various sub-items; see Table 1).In addition to total allocations, in each category, we calcu-
late annual per capita expenditure using (interpolated) district
population ﬁgures taken from the 2000 and 2010 Census. For
the teachers’ salaries and grants for basic schools, we use the
population in the relevant age group of primary school pupils
(7–13 years) in 2000 to calculate per capita ﬁgures. 13
For each budget item, the GFR reports budget estimates,
authorized provisions, actual expenditure, and budget vari-
ance. In addition to actual expenditure, we are thus also able
to calculate budget execution rates i.e., the ratio of money
expended compared to releases received by the respective
spending unit for each expenditure item, which provide a
measure of the deconcentrated government units’ operational
eﬃciency or absorptive capacity.
(c) Assessing public goods provision via education and health
outcomes
Data on education outcomes are relatively limited, covering
the number of pupils in grades 1–7 and grades 1–9 for the per-
iod 2004–09. From this and using census data on population
by age group, we were able to construct gross enrollment rates
for primary education (grades 1–7) and lower secondary edu-
cation (grades 8 and 9). In addition, we obtained data on the
total number of pupils and teachers (grades 1–12) for 2008;
and the number of schools, pupils, and teachers in basic
education for 2009.
Data on health are more comprehensive, although they
cover a shorter time frame (2004–08). Based on the available
data, we calculated 11 health indicators that include: the num-
ber of beds in health facilities per 1,000 inhabitants; health
center staﬀ per capita; hospital outpatient department staﬀ
per capita; the maternal mortality rate; the under-ﬁve
mortality rate; the rate of underweight children under ﬁve;
under one year olds’ immunization rates for tuberculosis, diph
theria–pertussis–tetanus, and polio; and the rate of fully
immunized children under one year.
(d) District-level covariates
District-level covariates that are expected to aﬀect govern-
ment expenditure and/or welfare outcomes were constructed
using information from various sources. As a general measure
of the level of deprivation, we calculated district-level poverty
headcounts using data from the 2006 LCMS. Annual district-
level population estimates were calculated by interpolating
data from the 2000 and 2010 Population Census. Data on
the district surface area measured in square kilometers were
extracted from the 2000 Population Census to capture the
spatial dimension of districts.
A dummy variable was constructed using the 2006 LCMS,
to control for possible infrastructure and scale economy eﬀects
from rural environments. We also used the routing function of
the Google MapsTM mapping service to construct a variable
that measures the distance by road from each district capital
to the national capital Lusaka, as a measure of geographic
location and remoteness.
Finally, and in order to control for possible political target-
ing of social sector spending, we used information on election
results in national presidential elections in 2001 and 2006 from
the Zambia Electoral Commission to construct a variable that
calculates the district share of votes for the ruling party,
Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) in the 2001
and 2006 presidential elections, using 2001 values for all years
up to 2006 and 2006 values for 2007 and subsequent years. As
a measure of local political competition, we calculated the
Table 1. Summary statistics for rural and municipal districts, 2004–09
Variable Deﬁnition Data source N Mean SD Min Max
Ethnic fractionalization by district
ELF-E ELF measure based on main ‘‘ethnic” groups as identiﬁed in the Census Census 2000 68 0.307 0.227 0.013 0.777
ELF-L ELF measure based on main ‘‘language” groups as identiﬁed in the Census Census 2000 68 0.201 0.182 0.005 0.683
District-level covariates
Area Surface area (km2) Census 2000 68 11 8 1 41
Poverty Poverty headcount in 2006 LCMS 2006 68 0.695 0.161 0.224 0.961
Population Logarithm of population Census 2000/10 408 11.694 0.554 9.975 13.003
Distance Lusaka Distance from the district capital to Lusaka (km) Google Maps
TM
68 577 294 45 1170
Rural Dummy variable = 1 if district is classiﬁed as rural (vs. municipal or city) LCMS 2006 68 0.794 0.405 0 1
Vote MMD Vote share for the ruling party in the most recent presidential election prior to the year of analysis (2001 for 2001–06 and 2006 for 2007–09) ECZ 136 0.418 0.200 .077 0884
Share MMD councilors % share of district council members belonging to the ruling party (2006) ECZ 65 56.047 31.013 0.000 100
Share Bemba % of population self-identifying as belonging to the Bemba ethnic group Census 2000 68 34.062 39.288 0.214 99.324
Share Tonga % of population self-identifying as belonging to the Tonga ethnic group Census 2000 68 16.876 30.511 0.055 93.394
Share North-West group % of population self-identifying as belonging to the North-West ethnic group Census 2000 68 14.666 27.988 0.067 98.371
Share Barotse % of population self-identifying as belonging to the Barotse ethnic group Census 2000 68 9.239 21.560 0.021 87.619
Share Nyanja % of population self-identifying as belonging to the Nyanja ethnic group Census 2000 68 12.996 27.811 0.133 96.966
Share Mambwe % of population self-identifying as belonging to the Mambwe ethnic group Census 2000 68 6.402 18.176 0.014 88.917
Share Tumbuka % of population e self-identifying as belonging to the Tumbuka ethnic group Census 2000 68 4.019 13.722 0.022 88.189
Central government district expenditure (in billion kwacha)
Education expenditure Total central government expenditure for education in each district GFR 408 10.537 6.373 0.809 47.020
Education expenditure p.c. Education expenditure per capita GFR 408 0.092 0.057 0.006 0.322
DEB expenditure Total central government expenditure to DEB GFR 408 0.639 1.186 0.046 16.430
DEB expenditure p.c. DEB expenditure per capita GFR 408 0.006 0.007 0.000 0.088
Basic school expenditure Total central gvt. expenditure for basic schools (incl. personal emoluments and grants) GFR 408 9.989 6.315 0.457 46.662
Basic expenditure p.c. Basic schools expenditure per capita GFR 408 0.087 0.055 0.004 0.310
Grants basic schools Expenditure on grants to basic schools GFR 406 0.875 1.105 0.000 5.675
Grants basic schools p.c. Expenditure on grants to basic schools per capita GFR 406 0.031 0.041 0.000 0.252
Teachers’ salaries Expenditure on teachers’ salaries GFR 400 5.821 4.375 0.013 37.116
Teachers’ salaries p.c. Expenditure on teachers’ salaries per capita GFR 400 0.198 0.124 0.001 1.020
Health expenditure Total DHMT team expenditure GFR 408 4.193 4.986 0.014 33.469
Health expenditure p.c. Total DHMT expenditure per capita GFR 408 0.030 0.034 0.000 0.450
Health service delivery Health service delivery expenditure; included items are: epidemic preparedness, provision of 1st level referral services,
roll back malaria, HIV/AIDS/STIs, tuberculosis, integrated reproductive health, child health, environmental health, mental health, oral health
GFR 272 1.403 0.981 0.062 7.812
Health service delivery p.c. Health service delivery expenditure per capita GFR 272 0.011 0.005 0.001 0.041
Budget execution rates
Education execution Education budget execution rate GFR 408 0.993 0.085 0.516 1.264
DEB execution DEB budget execution rate GFR 408 0.836 0.180 0.251 1.126
Basic schools execution Basic schools budget execution rate GFR 408 1.005 0.107 0.378 1.392
Basic school grant execution Grants to basic schools budget execution rate GFR 406 1.391 1.224 0.000 6.308
Teachers’ salaries execution Teachers’ salaries budget execution rate GFR 400 0.993 0.040 0.500 1.000
Health execution DHMT budget execution rate GFR 408 0.670 0.293 0.010 1.302
Health service execution Health service delivery budget execution rate GFR 272 0.813 0.242 0.098 2.137
Educational outcomes
Prim. school enrollment Primary school enrolment (grades 1–7) MoE 408 1.234 0.247 0.577 2.047
Low sec. enrollment Lower secondary school enrollment (grades 8 and 9) MoE 408 0.552 0.269 0.086 1.541
No. schools 2008 Number of schools (all schools) in 2008 MoE 68 116 52 21 278
No. teachers 2008 Number of teachers (all schools) in 2008 MoE 68 910 526 213 2799
No. basic schools 2009 Number of basic schools in 2009 MoE 68 114 52 18 285
TPR 2008 Teacher–pupil ratio (all schools) in 2008 MoE 68 0.022 0.005 0.013 0.038
Basic school TPR 2009 Teacher–pupil ratio for basic schools in 2009 MoE 68 0.019 0.005 0.009 0.035
Health outcomes
Total beds Number of beds in health facilities per 1,000 population MoH 329 2.236 1.073 0.705 6.531
HC staﬀ Health center staﬀ per 10,000 population MoH 329 4.208 2.128 0.687 12.305
Hospital OPD staﬀ Hospital outpatient department staﬀ per 10,000 population MoH 255 0.704 0.611 0.000 3.836
BCG immunization Under 1 year olds’ immunization rate for tuberculosis MoH 329 1.223 0.225 0.432 2.442
DPT3 immunization Rate of under 1 year olds with three doses of the combined diphtheria/pertussis/tetanus vaccine MoH 329 1.118 0.239 0.491 2.131
OPV3 immunization Rate of under 1 year olds with three doses of oral polio virus vaccine MoH 329 1.095 0.260 0.488 2.437
Measles immunization Under 1 year olds’ immunization rate for measles MoH 329 1.017 0.202 0.481 2.123
FIC immunization Rate of fully immunized under 1 year old children MoH 329 0.821 0.177 0.312 1.806
Maternal mortality Maternal mortality (log maternal deaths per 100,000 live births) MoH 289 5.354 0.743 2.954 7.437
Under 5 mortality Under ﬁve mortality (deaths of children under 5 per 1,000 live births) MoH 328 57.001 30.755 2.542 221.24
Underweight under 5 Underweight children under the age of 5 per 100 under 5 year olds weighed MoH 329 13.856 7.426 0.945 35.857
Note: GFR: Government Financial Reports (‘‘Blue Books”); LCMS: Living Conditions Monitoring Survey; DEB: District Education Board; DHMT: District Health Management Team; ECZ:













































314 WORLD DEVELOPMENTshare of MMD councilors on the district council after the 2006
elections. We also consider the population share of each main
ethnic group, along with fractionalization, as a possible con-
trol for ethnically-based political targeting (see Table 1).
An initial examination of the level of association between
the index of ethnic fractionalization (ELF-E) and most mea-
sures of public goods provision, including education and
health outcomes, reveals a positive and statistically signiﬁcant
association at conventional levels (see Table 2). The correla-
tion coeﬃcients vary in terms of magnitude but overall they
seem to favor a diversity dividend hypothesis. In the next
section we undertake a more rigorous econometric analysis
to examine this relationship.4. MODEL SPECIFICATION AND ECONOMETRIC
METHODS
Based on the theoretical discussion presented in Section 2,
we undertake the empirical analysis in two steps. First, we
begin in Section 4(a) with a model that tests the diversity debit
hypothesis with regard to spending on public goods. As above,
in centralized countries such as Zambia we predict no relation-
ship based on the major mechanisms elaborated in the litera-
ture on the diversity debit hypothesis. As a second step, we
develop a model in Section 4(b) that tests the diversity debit
hypothesis with regard to welfare outcomes. As above, in
centralized countries such as Zambia, we predict that a
negative relationship should be evident here if the diversity
debit hypothesis is correct.
(a) The government expenditure model
More formally, we derive a model that takes the form:
sit ¼ ait þ bxit þ kf i þ li þ ft þ mit ð2Þ
where the subscripts i and t denote district and year, respec-
tively; sit measures various items of government expenditure
on education or health; xit is a vector of district-level covari-
ates that are expected to aﬀect the government’s allocation




Primary school enrollment 0.25***
Lower secondary enrollment 0.31***
Number of teachers (2008) 0.41***
Teacher–pupil ratio (2008) 0.3**
Maternal mortality 0.17***
Under 5 mortality 0.21***
Underweight under 5 0.49***
Total beds p.c. 0.16***
Health center beds p.c. 0.3***
Hospital beds p.c. 0.13**
Health center staﬀ p.c. 0.47***






Note: coeﬃcients at conventional levels; *10% signiﬁcance level; **5%
signiﬁcance level; ***1% signiﬁcance level.to control for scale eﬀects with respect to central government
allocations; (ii) the local poverty headcount index as a measure
of deprivation that may capture the existing demands for
social services at local level; (iii) the district surface area to
capture the spatial dimension of districts that may aﬀect the
transaction costs associated with public goods provision; (iv)
a binary indicator that identiﬁes rural communities to capture
possible infrastructure and scale economy eﬀects; (v) the
distance to the national capital Lusaka as a measure for
remoteness and access to the center of political power, and
(vi) the ruling party’s vote share in past presidential elections,
which controls for the possibility of political targeting of
health and education spending. f i is the ethnic or linguistic
fractionalization index, the parameter of which measures the
eﬀect of ethnic diversity on government expenditure; li
denotes unobserved district-speciﬁc and time-invariant eﬀects;
ft is a vector of time dummies capturing universal time trends,
whereas a, b, k, and m are the intercept, the parameter
estimates and the idiosyncratic error term, respectively. We
estimate the model for each of the expenditure items both
for levels of total expenditure as well as in per capita terms.
The basic prediction of the diversity debit hypothesis can be
generally understood to be that the parameter of interest, k, is
negative and statistically signiﬁcant. However, as above, our
expectation at the sub-national level in centralized countries
is for no relationship.
There are some important constraints with regard to esti-
mating the eﬀect of ethnic diversity on public expenditure as
formulated by Eqn. (2). Ideally we would want to exploit
the within-district variation to estimate Eqn. (2) using ﬁxed-
eﬀects estimates in order to control for any unobserved
district-level characteristics that may aﬀect central government
allocation decisions. However, while we observe variation in
the expenditure variables over time, the fractionalization
indices as well as most covariates including poverty, district
surface area, distance to Lusaka, and the rural dummy are
time-invariant.
Furthermore, budget allocations tend to be path dependent,
with annual budget plans usually building incrementally on
allocations in preceding ﬁscal years. Incremental budgeting
implies that the expected errors are likely to be serially corre-
lated over time.
Given these data constraints we resort to estimate Eqn. (2)
using a panel feasible GLS estimator that corrects for ﬁrst-
order autocorrelation within panels. As a robustness check,
we also estimate Eqn. (2) with (i) a pooled ordinary least
squares (OLS) estimator with standard errors corrected for
correlation across panels, which allows for diﬀerent structures
of the error term, and (ii) a pooled OLS estimator that
assumes correlation across panels and more general serial cor-
relation in the error, following the method of Driscoll and
Kraay (1998).
(b) The welfare outcomes model
Regarding the relationship between ethnic diversity and
welfare outcomes, we estimate two models. The ﬁrst model
measures the eﬀect of ethnic diversity on a number of educa-
tion or health outcomes, after controlling for the district-
level covariates included in Eqn. (2), and the eﬀect of central
government expenditure on education or health, respectively,
which captures the government’s decisions to allocate public
funds to the districts, regardless of the size of the local
population. The second model measures the eﬀect of ethnic
diversity on the same welfare outcomes, after controlling for
the same district-level covariates and the eﬀect of per capita
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distribution across the local populations. More formally, the
outcome equations take the following form:
wit ¼ ait þ bxit þ /sit þ kf i þ li þ ft þ eit ð3Þ
where, as before, the subscripts i and t denote district and year
respectively; wit measures the education and health outcomes;
xit is the vector of district-level covariates derived in (2) that
are expected to aﬀect the welfare outcomes; sit measures total
(or per capita) government expenditure on education or
health; and f i again measures ethnic or linguistic fractionaliza-
tion. li, ft, a, b, /, and k, are as deﬁned above, whereas e is the
idiosyncratic error term.
The diversity debit hypothesis would predict the parameter
of interest, k to be negative and statistically signiﬁcant. We
note, however, that government expenditure is likely to be
endogenous. It is reasonable to expect that welfare outcomes
at district level are inﬂuenced by the allocation of public
resources, as much as the decision on how to distribute such
resources is likely to be inﬂuenced by local demands and social
needs. The presence of endogeneity would imply that sit is cor-
related with eit, and therefore under an OLS framework, Eqn.
(2) would yield biased and inconsistent estimates. To test and
address the endogeneity problem, we resort to instrumental
variable estimators, including two-stage least squares (2SLS),
limited information maximum likelihood (LIML), and gener-
alized method of moments (GMM) to obtain, under a pooled
cross-sectional setting, the following system of equations:
sit ¼ ait þ bxit þ kf i þ dzit þ li þ ft þ tit ð4Þ
wit ¼ ait þ bxit þ /s^it þ kf i þ li þ ft þ tit ð5Þ
where zit is a vector of strictly exogenous instrumental vari-
ables that are partially correlated with sit, so the coeﬃcient
of zit is nonzero, i.e., d–0 and Covðzit; titÞ–0, while zit is uncor-
related with wit, so Covðzit; eitÞ ¼ 0. Finding valid instruments
is thus important. We experiment with two approaches: First,
we exploit exogenous instrumental variables that have been
used previously in the literature. Speciﬁcally, we use the loga-
rithm of population, and the distance to the national capital,
Lusaka, as external instruments. With regard to the former
instrument, Easterly and Rebelo (1993) and Gebregziabher
and Nin˜o-Zarazu´a (2014) ﬁnd that the scale of the economy,
measured by its population, is an important determinant of ﬁs-
cal policy in general, and the allocation of social expenditure
in particular. Larger populations would have the eﬀect of
diminishing the average cost of providing public goods. These
scale eﬀects would arise from the nonconvexities associated
with the costs of public goods provision. Yet, there is no rea-
son to suspect that a particular district will achieve higher or
lower levels of welfare simply because it has more or less peo-
ple. The second instrument is based on the observation made
in previous studies that more remote areas in Zambia tend to
receive lower transfers from the central governments. Picazo
and Zhao (2009), for instance, ﬁnd that the most remote and
least urbanized areas in Zambia receive the lowest per capita
releases in the health sector (De Kemp, Faust, & Leiderer,
2011). This could imply that there is a negative correlation
between the distance to the capital city and the bargaining
power that rural communities are able to exercise to attract
public resources from the center; or that remote districts are
sanctioned more frequently in ﬁnancial terms if they fail to
meet formal planning or reporting requirements. It is not
entirely clear, however, whether more or less ﬁnancial
resources would necessarily lead to better or worse welfare
outcomes, after controlling for poverty and the ruralenvironment. We favor the use of log of population as our
preferred instrument, given past evidence about its validity,
but also experiment with distance to Lusaka as a secondary
instrument.
An initial examination of the pairwise correlations between
government expenditure, both in total and in per capita terms,
and the identiﬁed instruments show high correlations between
the endogenous variables and the log of population, with most
coeﬃcients exceeding r = 0.45 values; however, the correla-
tions become moderately low when using the distance to
the capital city as instrument, with r values ranging from
0.12 to 0.15.
To verify the validity of the instruments, we follow Stock
and Yogo (2005) to test for the concern of weak instruments
that can lead to size distortions of the Wald test on the param-
eters. The results for education outcomes show that the
Eigenvalue statistic and the F statistic comfortably exceed
the critical values of the Stock and Yogo statistic at 5% or
10% for both the 2SLS and LIML models, which allows us
to reject the null hypothesis of weak instruments, particularly
for the case of log of population, but also when combined with
distance to the capital city. While distance to the capital city
alone appears as a weaker instrument than log of population
when running the models of education outcomes, it becomes
stronger when running the models of health outcomes, espe-
cially when health expenditure is instrumented in per capita
terms (see Table 3). Therefore, we present the results in
Section 5 and also in the Appendix using the individual and
combined instrument sets.
Given the validity of the instruments, we resort to the
Hausman procedure (Hausman, 1978) to test for the assump-
tion of endogeneity of government expenditure using Eqns. (3)
and (5) so TH ¼ ð/^2SLS  /^OLSÞ2=V^ ð/^2SLS  /^OLSÞ is v2ð1Þ dis-
tributed under the null of exogeneity. As a robustness check,
we also compute the Durbin–Wu–Hausman (DWH) test,
which in addition produces robust test statistics (Davidson,
2000). The Hausman and DWH results for government expen-
diture on education and health strongly reject the null of exo-
geneity for most outcome variables (see Tables in Appendix
A). Therefore we conclude that government expenditure is
endogenous and thus favor the use of instrumental variables
estimators over OLS in the analysis.
Since we have longitudinal data, with most of the education
and health outcomes being observed over the 2004–09 period,
we extend the analysis to system-GMM (SGMM) estimators
in a dynamic setting, exploiting both the internally generated
instruments, and also their combination with the external
instruments. This strategy allows us to verify the robustness
of our results, in the absence of external instruments. Under
a dynamic framework, Eqn. (5) can be rewritten as follows:
wit ¼ aþ hwit1 þ bxit þ /s^it þ kf i þ li þ ft þ tit ð6Þ
where wit1 and h are the lag of the dependent variable and its
parameter estimate, respectively. The presence of district
ﬁxed-eﬀects, li, would suggest that the preferred approach is
a ﬁxed-eﬀects model, which would allow to mitigate the
heterogeneity-induced bias and control for district-related
endogeneity. However, the inclusion of lagged dependent
variables would produce inconsistent ﬁxed-eﬀects estimates.
The SGMM estimator developed by Blundell and Bond
(1998) circumvents the endogeneity problem by solving a sys-
tem of level and diﬀerence equations. Lagged diﬀerences of the
endogenous variables are used as instruments in the level
equations, while lagged levels of the endogenous variables
are used as instruments in the ﬁrst diﬀerenced equations.
SGMM improves the accuracy of estimates by exploiting
Table 3. Stock-Yogo test for weak instruments
Instruments
Instrumented variable Log population + km to Lusaka Log population Km to Lusaka
Education expenditure F-Statistic 40.67 78.96 15.12
Minimum eigenvalue 57.74 107.1 10.28
Education expenditure per capita F-Statistic 77.46 145.6 3.947
Minimum eigenvalue 154.4 277.5 4.111
Health expenditure F-Statistic 54.06 93.32 19.28
Minimum eigenvalue 51.20 78.95 23.62
Health expenditure per capita F-Statistic 6.37 7.27 8.00
Minimum eigenvalue 10.62 3.79 15.43
10% 15% 20% 25%
Critical values 2SLS/LIML size of nominal 5% Wald Test 16.38 8.96 6.66 5.53
316 WORLD DEVELOPMENTadditional moment conditions that are informative in the
presence of persistent data. Hence, we opt for a SGMM esti-
mator with external instruments as our preferred model in
Section 5(b), the robustness of which we test by comparing
the results with the SGMM using the internally generated set
of instruments, and also the 2SLS, GMM and LIML models. 145. RESULTS
(a) On ethnic diversity and budgetary outcomes
Contrary to our revised prediction, but consistent with the
basic prediction of the diversity debit hypothesis, we ﬁnd a
clearly negative relationship between ethno-linguistic fraction-
alization and central government expenditure at district level
in both sectors and across budget lines. Table 4 shows a sum-
mary of the panel regression results for each expenditure item
in absolute as well as per capita terms for both fractionaliza-
tion indices ELF-E and ELF-L. 15 Besides ethno-linguistic
fractionalization, the log of district population and the
distance by road to Lusaka appear to be good predictors of
diﬀerences in budget allocations between districts. As
expected, the log of population has a highly signiﬁcant positive
coeﬃcient in all speciﬁcations with total budget allocations,
and a negative one for per capita allocations, except for per
capita health spending. The distance to Lusaka is signiﬁcant
and negative throughout for total and per capita expenditure,
except for grants to basic schools and health service delivery,
where it is signiﬁcant only in some model speciﬁcations. 16
In contrast, and diﬀerent from recent studies on fertilizer
subsidies (Mason, Jayne, & van de Walle, 2013) or infrastruc-
ture projects (Leiderer, 2014) in Zambia, the results do not
provide particularly strong evidence for political targeting of
recurrent health and education expenditure, with the vote
share received by the ruling MMD insigniﬁcant in all speciﬁca-
tions except for DEB allocations and total and per capita allo-
cations for health service delivery (positive) and grants to basic
schools (negative). 17 The same goes for the share of MMD
members in the district council, as well as the shares of the
main ethnic groups in the population: including these variables
yields mostly insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients and, more importantly,
does not alter the results with respect to the negative relation
between ethno-linguistic fractionalization and expenditure. 18
Likewise, the poverty headcount is insigniﬁcant in most
speciﬁcations, except for per capita grants to basic schools
and total health allocations, and health service allocations,for which it has a (weakly signiﬁcant) positive coeﬃcient. This
suggests that social sector expenditure was not markedly
‘‘pro-poor” in Zambia during the second half of the past decade.
As described above, we run as robustness checks the same
equations with diﬀerent speciﬁcations that allow for correla-
tion across districts and autocorrelation of up to four lags.
The alternative speciﬁcations produce very similar results with
consistently smaller standard errors. 19
The results from the model described in Eqn. (2) may seem
to conﬁrm the diversity debit hypothesis that suggests a nega-
tive eﬀect of local ethno-linguistic fractionalization on public
goods provision via central government spending. However,
it is prima facie not clear, by which diversity debit mechanism
local diversity should aﬀect central government’s spending
decisions in a highly centralized governance system such as
Zambia’s, in particular so as measures of political competition
or ruling party dominance do not seem to play a role in central
government allocations on recurrent expenditure.
One explanation for the observed pattern could be that it is
not budget allocations, but the absorptive capacity of local
districts that diﬀers between districts with varying degrees of
ethnic fractionalization. In Zambia, local oﬃces of the central
government ministries act as the central government’s spend-
ing units at district level. The amount of money spent on pub-
lic goods depends not only on the amount of resources the
central government allocates to them, but also on the eﬀective-
ness and eﬃciency with which these spending units make use
of the available resources. If the hypothesis that ethnic diver-
sity leads to less eﬃcient institutions and governance is correct,
then we might expect the absorptive capacity of local spending
units to be negatively correlated with ethnic diversity.
To control for this possibility, we estimate Eqn. (2) with
budget estimates as well as execution rates (i.e., the ratio
between releases to each district education board, and district
health management team, and their corresponding executed
expenditure) as dependent variables. 20
However, the ﬁndings, which are presented in Table 1 of
Appendix C, do not support the absorptive capacity hypothe-
sis. The results for budget estimates are strongly in line with
those for actual expenditure ﬁgures, whereas the estimates
for budget execution rates are insigniﬁcant throughout
(Table 2 of Appendix C).
Taken together, our ﬁndings suggest that the observed neg-
ative relationship between ethnic fractionalization and central
government spending is in fact due to allocation decisions
taken at the central level and not because of diﬀerences in
the absorptive capacity of the deconcentrated spending units
Table 4. Panel GLS regression results for health and education expenditure
Dependent variable Main explanatory variable
ELF-E ELF-L
Total education expenditure – –
Total education expenditure per capita Negative* –
DEB expenditure Negative** Negative**
DEB expenditure per capita Negative* Negative**
Basic schools expenditure – –
Basic schools expenditure per capita Negative* –
Grants to basic schools – –
Grants to basic schools per capita in relevant age group – –
Teachers’ salaries – –
Teachers’ salaries per capita in relevant age group – –
Health expenditure Negative** Negative*
Health expenditure per capita – –
Health service expenditure Negative** Negative**
Health service expenditure per capita Negative** Negative***
Note: – coeﬃcient insigniﬁcant at conventional levels; *10% signiﬁcance level; **5% signiﬁcance level; ***1% signiﬁcance level.
ETHNIC HETEROGENEITY AND PUBLIC GOODS PROVISION IN ZAMBIA 317at district level. Yet, as noted in the previous section, if ethnic
fractionalization has a direct eﬀect on welfare outcomes at dis-
trict level, then it is likely that these allocation decisions are
endogeneous. In this case we would expect the estimates
underlying Table 4 to be biased and inconsistent. The second
step of our analysis addresses this constraint.
(b) On ethnic diversity and welfare outcomes
In the second stage of our analysis we follow Gerring et al.
(2015), Miguel (2004), and Miguel and Gugerty (2005) in
studying the direct link between ethnic diversity and welfare
outcomes.
Table 5 presents the OLS, 2SLS, GMM, and LIML regres-
sion results for ethnic fractionalization and welfare outcomes,
and the full regression results are reported in Appendix D.
Column 1 shows the coeﬃcients on ELF-E with signiﬁcance
levels for robust standard errors for the OLS estimator. Col-
umns 2–3 show the 2SLS estimates for education and health
expenditure instrumented with the log of district population
(column 2), the distance to Lusaka (column 3), and both
instruments (column 4). Columns 5 and 6 show the GMM
and LIML estimates using both instruments.
For the education sector, the results show a clearly positive
relationship across speciﬁcations between ethnic fractionaliza-
tion and primary school enrollment, but none with the other
outcome variables. For the health sector, the results are in line
with those obtained from the education sector: there is a
positive eﬀect of ethnic diversity on all immunization rates,
the under-ﬁve mortality rates, and the share of underweight
children under ﬁve (where a negative sign means a reduction
in underweight). The coeﬃcients on maternal mortality also
have the expected negative sign, but are statistically insigniﬁ-
cant. The only exception is the number of beds in health
facilities per 1,000 population, for which we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
negative relationship.
Given the speciﬁc setup of Zambia’s health system, health
indicators capture allocation decisions at diﬀerent levels of gov-
ernment. Procurement of medical supplies, capital investment,
and staﬀ allocations are the responsibility of the Ministry of
Health, whereas the DHMTs are responsible for service deliv-
ery at district level (ILO, 2008, p. 113). It is thus not surprising
that the coeﬃcient for beds in health facilities is negative, as it is
most likely driven by the same decisions taken at the centralgovernment level that drive general health expenditure. The
results for outcomes such as immunization are more likely to
be driven by decisions at the local level, whereas staﬃng of
health facilities is determined by central and local decision-
making (Bossert, Chitah, & Bowser, 2003, p. 359).
The results are highly robust across the various model spec-
iﬁcations and the selection of instruments for government
expenditure. Moreover, the eﬀects are comparable in terms
of magnitude and direction across models. A one standard
deviation increase in the ethnic fractionalization index leads
to an increase of the primary school enrollment rate of
between 5.7 and 6.9 percentage points. The eﬀect of ethnic
diversity on immunization rates is of comparable magnitude
at between 4.1 percentage points (for BCG immunization rates
in the GMM speciﬁcation) and 8.2 percentage points (for fully
immunized children in the 2SLS speciﬁcation with only
distance to Lusaka as instrument). The same increase in the
ethnic fractionalization index reduces under-ﬁve child mortal-
ity by 4.1 and 5.1 per 1,000 live births and the number of
underweight children per 100 weighed children under 5 by
between 2.9 and 3.2.
Controlling for per capita rather than total expenditure does
not alter the results for health substantially (see Table D1 in
Appendix D), with the exception of individual vaccination
rates in the 2SLS speciﬁcation with only the (log) population
instrument and the LIML model (except BCG immunization,
which remains signiﬁcant). For education, ELF-E becomes
positive and signiﬁcant for both lower secondary school
enrollment and the number of schools in 2008 across all spec-
iﬁcations (except number of schools 2008 in the 2SLS model
with distance to Lusaka as the only instrument).
With most of the education and health outcomes being
observed over various years, we extend the analysis to include
SGMM estimators in a dynamic setting. Table 6 shows the
SGMM estimates for the coeﬃcient on ethnic fractionalization
in diﬀerent speciﬁcations with lagged dependent variables
(columns 1–4) and without lagged dependent variables and
the two external instruments, jointly and individually, inputted
(columns 5–8). Individual regression tables for each outcome
variable are reported in Appendix E.
The SGMM results show similar results in terms of
direction, although for education outcomes the strength of
the association is much weaker, with only primary school
enrollment exhibiting a signiﬁcant and positive eﬀect in the
Table 5. Overview of regressions results for ethnic fractionalization and social sector outcomes
Method OLS 2SLSa 2SLSb 2SLSc GMMc LIMLc
Dependent variable Coeﬃcient on ELF-E
Primary school enrollment .261*** .305*** .249*** .300*** .304*** .303***
Lower secondary enrollment .046 .090 .002 .082 .037 .089
Teacher–pupil ratio (2008) .001 .003 .004 .002 .003 .003
Number of schools (2008) 14.156 40.042 22.264 38.088 35.096 38.644
Number of teachers (2008) 84.765 62.003 157.748 72.526 91.064 74.558
Teacher–pupil ratio in basic schools (2009) .003 .003 .003 .003 .003 .003
Number of basic schools (2009) 12.332 10.433 10.218 10.428 10.081 10.428
Total beds 1.107*** 1.006*** 1.265** 1.041*** 1.190*** .974**
Health Centre Staﬀ p.c. 2.554*** 2.686*** 2.170** 2.615*** 2.413*** 2.946**
Hospital OPD Staﬀ p.c. .284* .350* .218 .326* .085 .334*
BCG immunization .190*** .191*** .192*** .191*** .180*** .191***
DPT3 immunization .240*** .241*** .244*** .242*** .230*** .242***
OPV3 immunization .272*** .273*** .276*** .273*** .268*** .274***
Measles immunization .205*** .206*** .206*** .206*** .206*** .206***
FIC immunization .361*** .361*** .363*** .361*** .367*** .362***
Maternal mortality (log) .354 .331 .161 .307 .214 .291
Under 5 mortality 18.726** 18.702** 21.821** 19.128** 22.595*** 19.258**
Underweight under 5 12.981*** 12.980*** 12.711*** 12.943*** 13.354*** 12.941***
Notes: Values show estimated coeﬃcient for ethnic fractionalization index ELF-E. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 for robust standard errors.
a Instruments for central government expenditure using log population.
b Instruments for central government expenditure using distance from district capital to Lusaka.
c Instruments for central government expenditure using log population and distance from district capital to Lusaka.
318 WORLD DEVELOPMENTspeciﬁcations without the lagged dependent variable as an
explanatory variable. For the health sector, however, the
results remain fairly robust, with ethnic fractionalization hav-
ing a strong and positive eﬀect on immunization rates and a
reduction in the number of underweight children under the
age of ﬁve. 21
Tables E16–E30 in Appendix E present the results from the
SGMM equations instrumenting for per capita expenditure.
With per capita expenditure, ethnic fractionalization becomes
insigniﬁcant for primary school enrollment, whereas for health
outcomes the results remain highly robust.
Running the SGMM models with ELF-L instead of ELF-E
yields very similar results, with slightly larger coeﬃcients for
ELF-L than for ELF-E (see Table E32 in Appendix E).Table 6. Overview results of SGMM estimation for ethnic frac
With lagged dependent variable as regresso
Model (1)a (2)b (3)c (4)
Dependent variable
Prim. school enrollment .033 .032 .037 .03
Lower sec. enrollment .004 .007 .011 .0
Total beds 1.091** .172 .234 .6
Health Centre staﬀ p.c. .524 .016 .402 .0
Hospital OPD staﬀ p.c. .001 .065 .084 .00
BCG immunization .116 .131 .120 .140
DPT3 immunization .185** .102* .135** .117
OPV3 immunization .244*** .151* .193** .151
Measles immunization .213** .189** .188** .197
FIC immunization .309*** .201** .309*** .189
Maternal mortality (log) .028 .166 .012 .20
Under 5 mortality .772 3.049 1.259 1.73
Underweight under 5 2.989 .547 2.954 .84
Notes: Values show estimated coeﬃcient for ethnic fractionalization index EL
a (1) and (5) use only internal instruments (second and longer lags of central g
b (2) and (6) use both internal and external (log population and distance from
c (3) and (7) use internal and one external (log population) instrument.
d (4) and (8) use internal and one external (distance to Lusaka) instrument.Overall, we ﬁnd strong evidence for a positive eﬀect of
ethno-linguistic fractionalization on health outcomes at dis-
trict level in Zambia, particularly on immunization rates,
and the number of underweight children. The results for the
education sector are also consistent with our priors, although
somewhat weaker than for the health outcomes.
Since we are calculating parameter estimates from a relatively
large number of welfare outcomes, the probability of incurring
in type I errors, i.e., the likelihood of making false discoveries,
tends to increase with a larger number of conﬁdence intervals
from diﬀerent coeﬃcients. To address this problem, we control
for the family-wise error rate (FWER), which is the probability
that at least one true null hypothesis is rejected, using multi-test
procedures, including the Bonferroni correction method, andtionalization and all outcomes with total sector expenditure
r Without lagged dependent variable as regressor
d (5)a (6)b (7)c (8)d
1 .250* .253* .263* .230
06 .001 .024 .024 .016
75 1.450** 1.384** 1.477** 1.653***
02 2.625** 3.058** 2.892** 3.096**
1 .098 .140 .166 .086
* .157* .160 .152* .180*
* .326*** .256** .240** .281**
* .305*** .289** .243** .301**
** .240** .226** .220** .236*
** .356*** .422*** .362*** .415***
3 .158 .085 .074 .081
0 3.684 8.747 4.435 8.052
4 11.765*** 12.456*** 12.092*** 11.593***
F-E. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 for robust standard errors.
overnment education/health expenditure).
district capital to Lusaka) instruments.
Table 7. Number of reject null hypotheses using diﬀerent methods. Uncorrected p-value thresholds at 0.05 levels
Models FWER FDR








OLS 9 9 9 9 9 9
2SLSa 13 13 13 15 15 13
2SLSb 3 4 4 6 6 6
2SLSc 12 12 12 14 14 12
GMMc 12 14 14 18 18 14
LIMLc 12 13 13 14 14 13
SGMMd 4 4 4 4 4 4
SGMMe 7 7 8 9 9 8
Note: a instruments for central government expenditure using log population; b instruments for central government expenditure using distance from
district capital to Lusaka; c instruments for central government expenditure using log population and distance from district capital to Lusaka; d is
estimated with lagged dependent variable and no external instruments; e is estimated with lagged dependent variable and instruments for central
government expenditure using log population and distance from district capital to Lusaka. As ﬁve education outcomes are time invariant, we were able to
estimate OLS, 2SLS, GMM, and LIML models on 18 welfare outcomes whereas only on 13 outcomes using SGMM models.
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and Copenhaver (1987).
A drawback of multi-test procedures that control for
FWER is that they are, as pointed out by Newson and The
Alspac Study Team (2003), very conservative and can result
in low power to detect real diﬀerences. Therefore, we also
resort to less conservative procedures to control for the false
discovery rate (FDR), including the step-down methods of
Benjamini and Liu (1999a, 1999b), and the step-up approach
of Benjamini and Yekutieli (2001). Given that the p-values
of our sample are not normally distributed, and that they
could, in principle, be negatively correlated, we focus on the
results from the Holm and Benjamini and Yekutieli methods,
which are more conservative procedures that allow us to
control for FWER and FDR, respectively. 22
We calculate these procedures by setting an upper bound to
the set of rejected null hypotheses that are true for FWER and
the FDR at 0.05 levels. The results are presented in Table 7.
They indicate that for each of the rejected hypotheses we
can be 95% conﬁdent that they are not a false discovery, i.e.,
do not represent a type I error.6. DISCUSSION
Here we consider several possible explanations for the
Zambian results, and in particular the result most directly
counter to what the diversity debit hypothesis predicts – the
statistically signiﬁcant positive relationship found between
ethnic diversity and welfare outcomes.
This positive association could be consistent either with
diversity driving improved outcomes, or improved outcomes
driving higher diversity. Only the ﬁrst implies a diversity divi-
dend, while the second could be consistent with diversity debit
which is masked by the other, larger eﬀect.
Arguably the strongest argument against a diversity divi-
dend relates to the possible endogeneity of ethnic diversity
to various outcomes. Interestingly, the argument that ethnic
diversity is endogenous has also received a lot of attention in
critiques of quantitative studies of a diversity debit for growth
and development. Although much of this work has assumed
that ethnic diversity is exogenous, it is well-established in the
literature on ethnic politics that ethnic groups and divisions
are constructed and inﬂuenced precisely through the processes
explored in such analyses (Chandra, 2012; Green, 2013). Mod-
ernization and development, for instance, may inﬂuence the
emergence of broader national identities and the weakeningof ‘‘traditional” ethnic aﬃliations, consistent with a correla-
tion between high diversity in poor countries and low diversity
levels in wealthier countries.
Within the context and timeframe explored in our analysis,
however, a more likely way in which diversity would be
endogenous has to do with migration – i.e., if better public
goods provision in certain districts attracts immigration from
worse performing districts. Gerring et al. (2015) likewise
highlight this possibility as one explanation for their results,
positing that such ‘‘optimal sorting” is more likely at the
sub-national level because people can more freely move within
a country than across national borders, making diversity at
sub-national levels more a matter of choice than birth. At
the sub-national level ‘‘people who wish to live together are
more likely to be able to do so” and ‘‘those who choose to
relocate to diverse areas – rather than staying put or relocating
to an ethnic enclave comprised of persons with similar back-
grounds – are likely to be more ambitious, more skilled, and
more highly educated (Borjas, 1998; Damm, 2009) – and,
one might add, less averse to living amidst diversity”
(Gerring et al., 2015, p. 174).
While some optimal sorting may be occurring in Zambia, we
doubt that this is what is driving our results. For one, our
analysis excludes the four cities in the sample – presumably
where the most ambitious, pro-diversity migrants would prefer
to go. To the extent that we expect those in rural and
municipal districts not to be so diﬀerent from each other,
optimal sorting seems unlikely to be a major explanatory
factor. Further, additional analysis of our data does not
support the hypothesis of optimal sorting as diﬀerences in
the quality of public services across districts do not seem to
be a relevant factor in internal migration patterns, and migra-
tion does not have a substantial impact on ethnic diversity at
district level.
Both the LCMS and the population census record whether
and why individuals migrated into a district during the
12 months prior to the survey. The 2006 LCMS shows that
internal migration in Zambia is fairly low, with about 3% of
individuals (and households) having relocated during the past
12 months, the vast majority of which relocated within the
same district – i.e., their mobility would not have changed eth-
nic fractionalization measures at district level (Zambia, 2006,
p. 27). More importantly, diﬀerentials in the quality of public
services between districts do not appear to be a major driver of
rural inter-district migration. For instance, only 6% in the
relevant age group of 12–19 years gave attending school as a
reason for relocating (2% in the age group 0–11).
320 WORLD DEVELOPMENTAnalysis of census data does not support the hypothesis of
optimal sorting either. Using information from the 2000 and
the 2010 population census, we were able to calculate the cor-
relation between public goods provision and the observed
changes in ethnic fractionalization for all and ‘‘major” ethnic
groups in the period 2000–10. Our results show very low cor-
relations for health and education outcomes, the highest for
primary school enrollment at r = 0.1051 for major groups,
and for FIC immunization at r = 0.0828 for all groups. It thus
seems fair to say that our results are not driven by reverse
causation running from health and education outcomes to
ethnic fractionalization.
A related argument, put forward by Bates (1974) in the con-
text of African urbanization, but arguably applicable to the
rural context as well, is that processes of modernization them-
selves have served to increase ethnically-based identiﬁcation
and competition over education and jobs in particular. This
suggests that populations in more heterogeneous communities
may demand and make use of public services more actively
than in more homogeneous ones, for instance as a result of
more intense inter-group competition in the education system
and the local labor markets. 23
Another possible explanation for our results is how ‘scale’
may play a role in making sub-national communities more
likely to realize the beneﬁts of diversity (Gerring et al.,
2015). For example, we see in other contexts that local com-
munities can coordinate to provide common pool resources,
but such informal mechanisms may be unlikely to function
at the national level (Ostrom, 1990). With respect to Zambia,
however, the size of the sub-national units in question
(districts) raises questions about whether community politics
at this scale really beneﬁt from the sort of coordination
Ostrom shows: her focus is explicitly on ‘small-scale CPRs
[common pool resources], where . . . the number of individuals
aﬀected varies from 50 to 15,000 persons who are heavily
dependent on the CPR for economic reasons’ (Ostrom, 1990,
p. 26). District-level governance in Zambia operates on a
larger scale and without the same economic incentives.
Gibson and Hoﬀman (2013, p. 273) oﬀer yet another expla-
nation that ‘‘political institutions” – namely, electoral systems
– ‘‘can create incentives for politicians to work across ethnic
lines, even where ethnicity is a salient political factor.” To
be re-elected, politicians need to deliver beneﬁts to con-
stituents, which in turn provide incentives for them to form
coalitions to pass policy. Building on Bawn and Rosenbluth
(2006)’s ﬁndings on political fragmentation and government
expenditure, they propose that just as public expenditure
increases with the number of parties, it should also increase
with ethnic diversity. While this argument oﬀers important
traction on explaining the district-level spending analyzed by
Gibson and Hoﬀman, it does not oﬀer clear predictions with
respect to our ﬁnding that central government expenditure is
negatively correlated with ethnic fractionalization, whereas
outcomes improve with fractionalization.
Interestingly, however, Gibson and Hoﬀman’s empirical
ﬁndings suggest another explanation for our ﬁnding of a
statistically signiﬁcant negative relationship between ethnic
fractionalization and budget allocations: As noted above, we
would not have expected district-level ethnic fractionalization
to directly inﬂuence national budget allocations. However, it
might do so indirectly. In particular, to the extent that ethnic
fractionalization has an observed positive relationship with
district-level outputs and outcomes, it may indirectly lead to
lower allocations to these ‘‘less needy” districts. Our analysis
is supportive of this argument as we ﬁnd central government
expenditure to be endogenous in our econometric model. 24Another interpretation of our ﬁndings links to the extensive
literature on neopatrimonial regimes in Africa. The concept of
neopatrimonialism stresses the lack of eﬀective checks and
balances in the public sector, the importance of informal rules
and institutions for the distribution of public resources and the
capture of these resources by elites and leaders to maintain
extended clientelistic networks and patronage systems
(Bratton & van de Walle, 1994; Erdmann & Simutanyi,
2003; Leiderer et al., 2007; von Soest, 2007). If, in the absence
of eﬀective accountability mechanisms in the formal gover-
nance system, resources transferred from central government
in Zambia are subject to such capture by local groups, then
one might expect informal local rules and institutions to be
important determinants of the extent to which such capture
takes place in a particular district. Various studies suggest that
some form of local capture through informal processes may
indeed be happening at district level in Zambia. In a World
Bank Public Expenditure Review for the Zambian health
sector in 2008, Picazo and Zhao (2009, p. 33) argue that while
it is possible to trace resources from the Ministry of Health to
the districts, how allocation decisions are taken within the
district health management teams remains a ‘‘black box”
and does not form part of the formal ‘‘ﬁscal information
chain.” In a limited sample their study ﬁnds that only 50%
of reviewed health centers received their full allocations
(see Leiderer et al., 2012, p. 131).
Several informal processes would be consistent with the
positive relationship we ﬁnd between ethnic diversity and
public goods outcomes. For instance, if one assumes that
central government transfers captured by local leaders are
not used for the provision of public goods but mainly for
private consumption and patronage spending on each leader’s
own group, then each group might have a strong incentive to
curtail such capture by competing groups. It can be expected
that whether one group can eﬀectively keep another other one
from misappropriating public resources aimed at funding
public goods, strongly depends on the relative size of these
groups.
One would thus expect ‘‘informal” checks and balances at
local level to work more eﬀectively across more diverse com-
munities of comparable size than when a local community is
dominated by only one large group or a small number of
groups that may collude in diverting public resources. In
this case one would expect capture of public resources for
private consumption or patronage spending to be more
prevalent in more homogeneous districts than in those with
a more diverse population. Vice versa, in more heteroge-
neous communities, where informal checks and balances
between ethnic groups and their traditional leaders exist,
and no single dominant group (or their leader) is able to
capture a major share of central government transfers, a
larger share of central government transfers will be available
for the provision of public goods and services. As a result,
one would thus expect better welfare outcomes for given
levels of central government spending in ethnically more
diverse communities than in more homogeneous ones. This
line of argument seems to be consistent with the recent
experimental ﬁndings of Levine et al. (2014) which suggest
that ethnic diversity prevents detrimental herding behavior
and fosters greater inter-group scrutiny, which in turn leads
to better outcomes.
In sum, none of these diverse explanations alone is fully
satisfactory in explaining our empirical ﬁndings, but together
they speak to why ethnic diversity does not necessarily under-
mine public goods provision and the possible channels that
may underlie a diversity dividend.
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The ﬁndings in this study challenge the conventional
wisdom that ethnic diversity is associated with the under-
provision of public goods, a hypothesis that has been applied
particularly to understanding developmental deﬁcits in sub-
Saharan Africa. Using district-level data for Zambia across
a wider range of public goods-related indicators than analyzed
in previous work on the region, we show that ethnic fraction-
alization is not associated with the under-provision of public
goods and, indeed, has a positive relationship with some key
welfare outcomes. Our results are consistent across alternative
speciﬁcations and models. Drawing on these results and also
an emerging body of work challenging the diversity debit
hypothesis on empirical grounds, we conclude, contra theconventional wisdom, that given the more nuanced empirical
relationships now documented here, the key question for
future work is not so much ‘‘why does ethnic diversity
undermine public goods provision,” but ‘‘when does ethnic
diversity support public goods provision and aggregate
welfare and when does it undermine it?” and ‘‘why and
under what conditions does a diversity divided exist?”
(Habyarimana et al., 2007). What are the processes or mecha-
nisms underlying the diversity dividend that has now been
documented in multiple sub-national empirical studies,
including our own?
We do not have good answers to these questions, yet. How-
ever, by critically considering several possible explanations
proposed in the literature against the Zambian data, we point
to some promising directions for future research.NOTES1. Ethnic diversity may also be endogenous to development outcomes.
We return to this point later in the discussion.
2. It is worth nothing that these arguments are not necessarily tied to
the ethno-cultural characteristics of ethnic groups. If ethnic groups tend
to be regionally concentrated – for whatever reason – they may have
diﬀerent and conﬂicting interests over where to locate schools, roads, or
health centers, regardless of cultural commonalities, ethnic hatreds, or
historical ethnic myths of origin. Likewise, economic inequalities
between groups may also drive the relationship, perhaps through
impact on between-group diﬀerences in preferences, prejudice, and social
capital (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000; Baldwin & Huber, 2010; Waring,
2012).
3. Private consumption (c) is equal to exogenous pre-tax income (y)
minus a lump-sum tax (t). The population size is normalized at 1, so that g
represents the per capita and aggregate size of the public good.
4. Why this relationship holds however remains open for discussion.
Alesina et al.’s (1999) model is widely cited, but it relies on the median
voter theorem which is generally formulated on the basis of two-party
competition under plurality rule – i.e., a diﬀerent institutional context to
many of the countries under analysis. Interpretation is further complicated
by the quality of data on public goods provision and government budgets
that is available at the cross-national level.
5. In the rest of this paper, we use ‘‘diversity” and ‘‘divisions”
interchangably. In referring to diversity, we mean more speciﬁcally
diversity measured using socially and politically salient categories such as
those used in our Zambian analysis.
6. There is also a positive relationship with spending on police. This
arguably can be reconciled within the model: polarized preferences may
also lead to higher levels of social conﬂict and thus greater demands for
policing.
7. For instance, intergovernmental transfers in the US may be inﬂuenced
indirectly by ethnic diversity, thus aﬀecting local spending.
8. Nor, in most of Africa, do they contribute a large share of tax
revenues.
9. Although we have data on welfare outcomes for the period 2001–09,
the shorter time window of the expenditure data, from 2004 to 2009,
meant that we were able to only cover the period 2004–09 in our analysis.10. It is worth noting that the ethnic groups used in our analysis also
approximate the politically salient groups identiﬁed by the Ethnic Power
Relations dataset version 3.01 (Wimmer, Cederman, & Min, 2009): Bemba
speakers, Tonga-Ila-Lenje, Nyanja speakers (Easterners), Lozi (Barotse),
Lunda (NW Province), Luvale (NW Province), and Kaonde.
11. In spite of their similarity, it can be argued that each index reﬂects
diﬀerent aspects of ethno-linguistic diversity. The ELF-E is presumably
the more accurate measure of fractionalization in terms of ethnic self-
identiﬁcation and thus speaks to those mechanisms underlying the
diversity debit hypothesis that stress the role of preferences or trust
within and across ethnic groups. The ELF-L in contrast may be more
relevant to the social salience of fractionalization in terms of language use
for ‘‘day-to-day communication with [. . .] neighbors, at factory, in oﬃce,
in market places, etc.” (Republic of Zambia, 2000, p. 43), which is
arguably driven at least partly by social and economic needs rather than
ethnic self-identiﬁcation. This measure therefore may be more relevant to
those mechanisms that stress the role of social capital. As is to be expected,
the average ELF-L (and its standard deviation) is substantially smaller
than the ELF-E (see Table 1), as people in ethnically diverse communities
will generally use only a limited number of common languages for
everyday communication.
12. These grants are used by basic schools to purchase mostly locally
procured learning and teaching materials.
13. Population by age-group is only available from the 2000 Census.
14. We note that SGMM may suﬀer from the weak instrument problem
when the time series is large and substantial unobserved heterogeneity
exists (Bun & Windmeijer, 2010; Hayakawa, 2007). Given the short time
series of our data, we suspect this problem to be minimal. Another
potential deﬁciency of the SGMM estimators is that the number of
internal instruments grows quadratically as the number of time periods
increases. Roodman (2009) cautions that instrument proliferation can
over-ﬁt endogenous variables, biasing coeﬃcient estimates and weakening
the Hansen test of the instruments’ joint validity. Therefore, we reduce the
instrument count by ‘‘collapsing” instruments which is superior to simply
restricting the lag ranges.
15. Detailed regression results for ELF-E are reported in Appendix C.
16. See Tables C4, C6, C7 in Appendix B.
17. See Tables C2, C4, C7 in Appendix C.
322 WORLD DEVELOPMENT18. Results not reported but available on request.19. Details not reported but available on request.20. Budget execution rates vary substantially between districts and years.
For overall education expenditure, the average execution rate in the
sample is 99.3%, with a standard deviation of 8.5 percentage points and a
minimum value of 51.6% and a maximum of 126%. For health
expenditure, the mean execution rate is 66% (standard deviation 29
percentage points), with a minimum value of 1% and a maximum of 130%.
21. Including the ruling party’s vote share as an additional endogenous
regressor does not substantially alter the results, but slightly increases
coeﬃcients on ethnic fractionalization and signiﬁcance levels. In addition,
the Sargan–Hansen tests of overidentifying restrictions perform somewhatbetter in individual speciﬁcations. The results reported here, therefore,
arguably represent conservative estimates of the eﬀect of ethnic fraction-
alization.
22. Note that other procedures produce very similar results.
23. This argument appears broadly consistent with our ﬁnding that in
particular outcomes that require the active participation of target groups,
such as primary school enrollment and children’s immunization rates, are
positively correlated with ethnic fractionalization.
24. As Gibson and Hoﬀman’s (2013) analysis suggests, there may also be
a positive relationship between ethnic fractionalization and district council
revenues and spending, which – even if only a minor share of the total
budget – could also help to explain the negative sign in our results on
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